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ABSTRACT
Adversarial attacks pose a threat to deep learning models.
However, research on adversarial detection methods, espe-
cially in the multi-modal domain, is very limited. In this
work, we propose an efficient and straightforward detection
method based on the temporal correlation between audio and
video streams. The main idea is that the correlation between
audio and video in adversarial examples will be lower than
benign examples due to added adversarial noise. We use the
synchronisation confidence score as a proxy for audio-visual
correlation and based on it we can detect adversarial attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on detec-
tion of adversarial attacks on audio-visual speech recognition
models. We apply recent adversarial attacks on two audio-
visual speech recognition models trained on the GRID and
LRW datasets. The experimental results demonstrated that
the proposed approach is an effective way for detecting such
attacks.
Index Terms— Audiovisual Speech Recognition, Adver-
sarial Attack Detection, Audiovisusal Synchronisation
1. INTRODUCTION
Deep networks achieve state-of-the-art performance on sev-
eral tasks such as image classification, image segmentation
and face recognition. However, recent studies [1, 2] show
that such networks are susceptible to adversarial attacks.
Given any input x and a classifier f(·), an adversary tries
to carefully construct a sample xadv that is similar to x but
f(x) 6= f(xadv). The adversarial examples are indistin-
guishable from the original ones but can easily degrade the
performance of deep classifiers.
Existing studies on adversarial attacks have mainly fo-
cused in the image domain [2, 3, 4, 5]. Recently, adver-
sarial attacks in the audio domain have also been presented
[6, 7]. One of the most prominent studies is the iterative
optimisation-based attack [7], which directly operates on an
audio clip and enables it to be transcribed to any phrase when
a perturbation is added. Works on defense approaches against
adversarial attacks can be divided into three categories: adver-
sarial training [2], gradient masking [8] and input transforma-
tion [9]. The first one adds adversarial examples in the train-
ing set whereas the second one builds a model which does not
have useful gradients. Both of them require the model to be
retrained, which can be computationally expensive. In con-
trast, the latter one attempts to defend adversarial attacks by
transforming the input.
On the other hand, work on how to detect adversarial at-
tacks is very limited. To the best of our knowledge, the only
work in the audio domain was proposed by Yang et al. [10]
and exploits the inherent temporal dependency in audio sam-
ples to detect adversarial examples. The main idea is that the
transcribed results from an audio sequence and segments ex-
tracted from it are consistent in benign examples but not in
adversarial ones. In other words, the temporal dependency is
not preserved in adversarial sequences.
Inspired by the idea of using temporal dependency to
detect audio adversarial examples, we propose a simple and
efficient detection method against audio-visual adversarial
attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
which presents a detection method of adversarial attacks on
audio-visual speech recognition. The key idea is that the
audio stream is highly correlated with the video of the face
(and especially the mouth region). In case of an adversarial
example, the added noise on the audio and video streams is
expected to weaken the audio-visual correlation. Hence, we
propose the use of audio-visual synchronisation as a proxy to
correlation. In other words, we expect higher synchronisation
scores for benign examples and lower scores for adversarial
examples.
The proposed detection method is tested on speech recog-
nition attacks on models trained on the Lip Reading in the
Wild (LRW) [11] and GRID datasets [12]. Our results show
that we can detect audio-visual adversarial attacks with high
accuracy.
2. DATABASES
For the purposes of this study, we use two audiovisual
datasets, the LRW [11] and GRID [12] datasets. The LRW
dataset is a large-scale audio-visual dataset consisting of clips
from BBC programs. The dataset has 500 isolated words
from more than 1000 speakers and contains 488766, 25000,
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Fig. 1. An overview of our proposed detection method. (a) A video and an audio clip are fed to the end-to-end audio-visual
speech recognition model. They are also fed to the synchronisation network (b) which estimates a synchronisation confidence
score which is used for determining if the audio-visual model has been attacked or not (c). The confidence distribution of 300
adversarial and benign examples from the GRID dataset is shown in (d).
and 25000 examples in the training, validation and test sets,
respectively. Each utterance is a short segment with a length
of 29 frames (1.16 seconds), where target words are centred
in the segment of utterances.
The GRID dataset consists of 33 speakers and 33000
utterances (1000 per speaker). Each utterance is composed
of six words taken from the combination of the following
components: <command: 4><colour: 4><preposition:
4><letter: 25><digit: 10><adverb: 4>, where the number
of choices for each component is indicated in the angle brack-
ets. In this work, we follow the evaluation protocol from [13]
where 16, 7 and 10 subjects are used for training, validation
and testing, respectively.
3. BACKGROUND
3.1. Attacks
In this study, we consider two attack methods, Fast Gradient
SignMethod (FGSM) [2] and the iterative optimisation-based
attack [7]. FGSM, which is suitable for attacks on classifica-
tion models, computes the gradient with respect to the benign
input and each pixel can be updated to maximise the loss.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [14] is an extended version of
FGSM by applying it multiple times with a small step size.
Specifically, given a loss function J(·, ·) for training the clas-
sification model f(·), the adversarial noise xadv is generated
as follows:
x
adv
0 = x
x
adv
N+1 = Clipx,ǫ{x
adv
N + αsign(∇xJ(f(x
adv
N ), ytrue)}
(1)
where α is the step size, xadvN is the adversarial example after
N -steps of the iterative attack and ytrue is the true label. Af-
ter each step, pixel values in the adversarial images xadv are
clamped to the range [x − ǫ,x+ ǫ], where ǫ is the maximum
change in each pixel value. This method was proposed for
adversarial attacks on images but can also be applied to audio
clips by crafting perturbation to the audio input.
The second type of attack [7] has been recently proposed
and is suitable for attacks on continuous speech recognition
models. Audio adversarial examples can be generated, which
can be transcribed to any phrase but sound similar to the be-
nign one. Specifically, the goal of this targeted attack is to
seek an adversary input xadv, which is very close to the be-
nign input x, but the model decodes it to the target phrase
ztarget. The objective of the attack is the following:
minimize J(f(x+ δ), ztarget)
such that ‖δ‖ < ǫ (2)
where ǫ is introduced to limit the maximum change for each
audio sample or pixel and δ is the amount of adversarial noise.
3.2. Audio-visual Speech Recognition Threat Model
The architecture is shown in Fig. 1a. We use the end-to-
end audiovisual model that was proposed in [15]. The video
stream consists of spatiotemporal convolution, a ResNet18
network and a 2-layer BGRU network whereas the audio
stream consists of a 5-layer CNN and a 2-layer BGRU net-
work. These two streams are used for feature extraction from
raw modalities. The top two-layer BGRU network further
models the temporal dynamics of the concatenated feature.
According to the problem type, two different loss func-
tions are applied for training. The multi-class cross entropy
loss, where each input sequence is assigned a single class, is
suitable for word-level speech recognition. The CTC loss is
used for sentence-level classification. This loss transcribes
directly from sequence to sequence when the alignment be-
tween inputs and target outputs is unknown. Given an input
sequence x = (x1, ..., xT ), CTC sums over the probability
of all possible alignments to obtain the posterior of the target
sequence.
4. SYNCHRONISATION-BASED DETECTION
METHOD
Chung et al. [16, 17] introduced the SyncNet model, which is
able to predict the synchronisation error when raw audio and
video streams are given. This error is quantified by the syn-
chronisation offset and confidence score. A sliding window
approach is used to determine the audio-visual offset. For
each 5-frame video window, the offset is found when the dis-
tance between the visual features and all audio features in a±
1 second range is minimised. The confidence score for a par-
ticular offset is defined as the difference between the the min-
imum and the median of the Euclidean distances (computed
over all windows). Audio and video are considered perfectly
matched if the offset approaches to zero with a high level of
confidence score.
In this work, we aim to explore if such synchronisation is
affected by adversarial noise. The detection method is shown
in Fig. 1b and 1c. In the detection model, we measure the
temporal consistency between the audio and video streams
via a model trained for audio-visual synchronisation. For be-
nign audio and video streams, the confidence score should be
relatively high since audio and video are aligned and there-
fore highly synchronised. However, for adversarial audio and
video examples, the confidence score is expected to be lower.
The added perturbation, which aims to alter the model toward
the target transcription, reduces the correlation between the
two streams, hence they are less synchronous. Fig. 1d. shows
the confidence distribution of 300 benign and adversarial ex-
amples from the GRID dataset.
5. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
5.1. Attacks
We evaluate our proposed method using two adversarial at-
tacks on both modalities. We assume a white-box scenario,
where the parameters of models are known to the attacker.
Attacks against Word-level Classification: Attacks such
as FGSM and BIM are suitable for word recognition models
trained on the LRW dataset. For FGSM, ǫA for the audio
stream and ǫV for the video stream, were chosen heuristically.
In our case, we set ǫA to 1024 and ǫV to 161. For BIM, the
1Pixel values are in the range of [0, 255]. Audio samples are in the range
of [-32768, 32767].
(a): Benign example (b): Adversarial noise (c): Adversarial example
Fig. 2. One example using iterative optimisation-based attack
on the GRID dataset. (a): benign example; (b): adversarial
noise; (c): adversarial example; Raw audio waveforms, au-
dio log-spectrum and raw images are presented from top to
bottom.
step size αV was set to 1 in the image domain, which means
the value of each pixel is changed by 1 at each iteration. The
step size αA in the audio domain is set to 64. We follow
the number of iterations setting suggested by [14], which is
selected to bemin(ǫV + 4, 1.25ǫV ).
Attacks against Continuous Speech Recognition: For at-
tacking a speech recognition model trained on GRID we use
a recently proposed targeted attack [7]. The maximum change
allowed as defined by ǫ (see Eq. 2) is initialised to 2048 and
32 for audio and video, respectively, and is reduced during
iterative optimisation. We implement the attack with 1000 it-
erations. In our studies, 10 random utterances are selected
as target utterances. 300 adversarial examples are randomly
selected for each target utterance.
5.2. Evaluation Metrics
We use the Euclidean distance (L2) for measuring the similar-
ity between two images. We also use theL∞ norm to measure
the maximum change per pixel. For audio samples we follow
[7] and convert the L∞ norm to the scale of Decibels (dB):
dB(x) = max
i
20 · log10(xi), where xi is an arbitrary audio
sample point from the audio clip x. The audio distortion is
specified as the relative loudness to the benign audio, which
can be defined as dBx(δ) = dB(δ) − dB(x).
The Area Under the Curve (AUC) score is used for eval-
uating the detection approach. We compute the synchronisa-
tion confidence score in benign and adversarial examples and
Table 1. Results for the proposed adversarial attack detection
approach on word recognition models trained on the LRW
dataset. LV
∞
is 4 and 8 pixels when ǫV is 16 and 32, respec-
tively. LA
∞
is -19dB when ǫA is 1024.
Attacks CR(%) LV2 AUC F1
FGSM (ǫA=1024, ǫV =16) 13.67 3.46 0.99 0.94
FGSM (ǫA=1024, ǫV =32) 12.40 6.89 0.99 0.96
BIM (ǫA=1024, ǫV =16) 6.67 1.22 0.89 0.82
BIM (ǫA=1024, ǫV =32) 3.27 1.67 0.93 0.85
by varying the threshold we compute the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve.
Finally, in order to compare how this approach would
work in a real scenario, we select the threshold (from Fig. 1c)
which maximises the average F1 score of adversarial and be-
nign classes on the validation set. Then we use this threshold
to compute the average F1 score on the test set.
6. RESULTS
6.1. Word-level Speech Recognition
Detection results for attacks on word-level speech recogni-
tion are shown in Table 1. In the presence of adversarial
noise, the classification rate drops from 97.20% 2 to 12.40%
using FGSM whereas it drops to 3.27% after running 36 iter-
ations using BIM. On the other hand, this detection method
achieves an AUC score as high as 0.99 using FGSM and 0.93
using BIM. The corresponding F1 scores are 0.96 and 0.85,
respectively.
We also notice that when the attack is stronger, e.g., BIM
is used instead of FSGM, the classification rate goes down,
i.e., the attack is more successful, and at the same time the
distortion (LV2 ) becomes smaller. Consequently, detection be-
comes more difficult and this is reflected to the lower AUC
and F1 scores.
We also investigate the detection performance when the
ǫV decreases to 16 from 32, i.e., the pixel values change less.
It is clear from Table 1 that for both types of attacks the dis-
tortion is smaller and as a consequence detection becomes
harder, both AUC and F1 scores go down. However, such at-
tacks are less successful since the classification rate goes up.
6.2. Sentence-level Speech Recognition
Detection results for fully targeted attacks on sentence-level
speech recognition, i.e., the goal of the attack is that the tran-
scribed result is the same as the desired target phrase, are
shown in Table 2. It is clear that the attack is almost al-
ways successful no matter what the target sentence is, more
than 92% of the examples are transcribed as the target phrase.
At the same time the detection rates are quite high with an
2This is the performance of the model trained on the LRW dataset when
benign examples are fed to it.
Table 2. Results of the proposed audio-visual synchronisa-
tion detection on fully targeted adversarial attacks, i.e., the
goal of the attack is to make the WER between transcribed
and target phrases 0, on continuous speech recognition mod-
els trained on GRID. The success rate is the proportion of
adversarial examples with WER equal to 0. (ǫA = 1024,
ǫV = 16)
Target Phrases Success Rate LV2 L
V
∞
LA
∞
(dB) AUC F1
bin blue at a zero please 0.99 5.37 7.63 -41.41 0.95 0.83
bin white by o nine now 0.99 5.27 7.48 -40.18 0.94 0.83
lay green with y seven again 0.99 5.67 8.06 -40.47 0.95 0.83
lay red at c eight soon 0.99 5.61 7.96 -40.64 0.95 0.81
place blue at p one again 0.98 5.39 7.65 -42.37 0.93 0.81
place red by a one soon 0.99 5.25 7.45 -42.00 0.93 0.81
place red by z two soon 0.98 5.42 7.69 -40.70 0.95 0.84
set green in f one again 0.99 5.53 7.87 -40.09 0.96 0.83
set red in x four now 0.92 5.90 8.38 -37.99 0.97 0.86
set white in p five now 0.97 5.66 8.04 -39.99 0.95 0.82
Table 3. Results of the proposed audio-visual synchronisa-
tion detection on targeted adversarial attacks on continuous
speech recognition models trained on GRID. The WER be-
tween transcribed and target phrases is up to 50%. The suc-
cess rate is the proportion of adversarial examples with WER
less than 50%. (ǫA = 1024, ǫV = 16)
Target Phrases Success Rate LV2 L
V
∞
LA
∞
(dB) AUC F1
bin blue at a zero please 1.00 5.10 7.27 -51.39 0.91 0.79
bin white by o nine now 1.00 5.25 7.47 -48.86 0.91 0.79
lay green with y seven again 1.00 5.24 7.45 -49.28 0.91 0.79
lay red at c eight soon 1.00 5.01 7.13 -49.54 0.91 0.79
place blue at p one again 1.00 4.83 6.90 -51.71 0.88 0.76
place red by a one soon 1.00 5.02 7.14 -49.93 0.89 0.79
place red by z two soon 1.00 5.14 7.31 -48.33 0.91 0.80
set green in f one again 1.00 5.14 7.32 -47.43 0.92 0.80
set red in x four now 1.00 5.15 7.33 -46.19 0.92 0.80
set white in p five now 1.00 5.19 7.40 -46.39 0.91 0.78
AUC between 0.93 and 0.97 and an F1 score between 0.81
and 0.86. We also observe that the maximum distortions ap-
plied to the audio and video signals are similar in most cases.
We also consider another scenario where the WER be-
tween the transcribed results and target phrases is up to 50%.
Results are shown in Table 3. In this case the attack is always
successful. In addition the generated audio and video adver-
sarial examples are less distorted than the ones generated by
the fully targeted attacks. In turn, this leads to smaller AUC
scores, between 0.88 and 0.92, and F1 scores, between 0.76
and 0.80.
7. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have investigated the use of audio-visual syn-
chronisation as a detection method of adversarial attacks. We
hypothesised that the synchronisation confidence score will
be lower in adversarial than benign examples and demon-
strated that this can be used for detecting adversarial attacks.
In future work, we would like to investigate more sophisti-
cated approaches for measuring the correlation between audio
and visual streams.
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